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I. INTRODUCTION
In my book Justifying Intellectual Property (JIP), I wrote about what I 
call the “foundations” of the field of intellectual property (IP) law.1 
I tried to distinguish between a foundational level of discourse and
another level, the level of basic principles.  In the San Diego conference 
at which my book was discussed—and in several other settings as 
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well—the most frequent and persistent line of questioning about my
book centered on the relationship between these two levels.  That is what
this brief Article is about. 
For me, the foundational question in the IP field is whether IP 
should exist at all.  Should society award state-backed exclusive rights— 
property—over works of creativity and imagination, and if so, why?  In
Part I of JIP, I say yes.  I argue that on the basis of the works of Locke
and Kant respecting property rights, IP protection is justified.2  I go on to 
say that, consistent with the work of John Rawls, IP represents a just
social institution from the perspective of the fair distribution of resources 
in society.3  It is not, in other words, fatally elitist. 
Having answered the foundational question in the affirmative, 
I proceed in JIP to describe four basic or “midlevel” principles of IP
law.4  These are the basic conceptual building blocks of the legal field as 
it is practiced in the world. The four principles themselves are
straightforward: (1) efficiency; (2) nonremoval or preservation of the 
public domain; (3) proportionality; and (4) dignity.  Despite my best 
efforts to be clear, some readers have been confused by the relationship 
between these principles and the foundations of the field. 
Much of the head-scratching stems, I think, from my rejection of 
utilitarianism as an effective foundation for IP law.  This is a function of
two related issues.  Part I of JIP does not say enough, I have come to
see, about exactly what I demand of a foundation and what my criteria 
are for accepting or rejecting one.  This I address in Part II of this Article.
Another aspect of the first part of JIP is the notion of foundational 
pluralism; this too has led to some interesting questions.  How, it was 
asked, could I both insist on the need for foundations and yet tolerate, or 
even invite, multiple and inconsistent alternative groundings for the 
field?  Part II of this Article also reviews my thinking in this regard.
After Part II, the second major topic I address is how I can reject
utilitarianism as a foundation and yet include efficiency as one of the
four basic principles of IP law.  The answer to this is the heart of Part III 
below, where I try to show the difference between a foundational 
justification—which must answer the “whether” question, as in “whether
we should have this field”—and a basic conceptual principle that helps a
field operate effectively, once it is decided that such a field ought to 
exist.  The “how” of midlevel principles, in other words, is a very 
different inquiry from the more fundamental question of whether.  My
argument is that we cannot justify IP rights based on current knowledge 
2. See id. at 31–101. 
3. See id. at 102–38. 
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of their costs and benefits.  The data are inadequate to the task.  But,
given the decision to have IP rights, important features of our current IP 
regime can be explained by recourse to the principle of efficiency. 
Using the best data and analytic techniques at our disposal, we as a
society try to maximize the net benefits of IP rights.  Put simply, the
argument is that we do not have IP rights because we are sure they are
efficient, but given that we have them—because they are justified by
Lockean, Kantian, and other precepts—we strive to make our IP system 
as efficient as possible.  So efficiency explains and ties together important
aspects of the IP system as practiced, even though we cannot be sure that 
as a whole, IP systems are a net benefit and thus efficient in an overall or 
global sense.  To state this simply, I would say that efficiency is a good
quality or feature for an IP system, but not an acceptable rationale for it.5 
My insistence on foundational pluralism, together with the idea that 
foundations serve a very different purpose compared to midlevel principles,
leads to a final, obvious question: Is there any sort of working relationship
between the two?  Even if one accepts the very different conceptual roles 
of foundations and principles, it still makes sense to ask whether 
foundations influence principles in any way.  This is another issue I have 
been asked about by several readers of JIP. 
The answer is in Part IV of this Article.  Here I develop some 
comments from JIP, in an attempt to clarify the “tiebreaking” role of the 
foundations in cases where multiple midlevel principles are in conflict. 
The basic notion is that in the hardest of cases, one will and should have 
resort to one’s ultimate normative commitments in taking a personal
position.  So this type of case represents the rare situation in which the 
“whether” question influences the “how” of the IP system.  This does not 
change my view that for almost all purposes foundations are functionally 
independent of the midlevel principles, however. 
Part V concludes with some final thoughts on the need for foundations,
the role of midlevel principles, and the importance of detailed doctrines 
and practices in IP law. 
5. In some related writing, I respond to two related concerns: (1) the possibility of
foundations independent from midlevel principles; and (2) the relationship between midlevel 
principles and the doctrinal/institutional details of IP systems.  See Robert P. Merges, 
Foundations and Principles Redux: A Reply to Blankfein-Tabachnick, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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II. ON “WHETHER”: FOUNDATIONS AND STRUCTURE 
For me, a proper foundation for IP law must answer one question— 
whether society should grant IP rights at all.  Answering this “whether”
question, and providing solid reasons for the answer, is what makes a
workable foundation.
One immediate objection to the idea of foundations is this: How can I 
say whether IP rights make sense unless I know at least the main
features of the IP system being proposed?  This perspective would reject 
as artificial the distinction between foundations and basic principles and
would insist that “whether” is always dependent on how an IP system is 
put together at the structural level. 
A recent book describes IP law very much along these lines.  In 
Constructing Intellectual Property, author Alexandra George argues that 
“intellectual property exists only after it has been brought into being by
law, and . . . is therefore a figment of the collective imagination.”6  She
does not take an explicitly normative view, opting instead for a more 
phenomenological approach that takes the existing social practice of IP 
law as a starting point.7  She is not concerned with the “norms contained 
in [IP] laws,” but with “how and in what form they came to exist.”8  She
aims to expose the generative story behind IP law as it now stands and to
thereby correct the misunderstanding that this body of law is founded on 
timeless, straightforward principles.9 
My approach in JIP Part I is obviously quite different.  I draw on a
long tradition of philosophers who seek a pure bedrock starting position. 
Whether it is Locke with the state of nature, Kant with his purely 
abstract thought experiments on topics such as property, or Rawls with 
his original position, the idea is to move away from factual detail toward
an idealized account that lays bare the foundational components of the 
institution or practice in question.  This is not to say that I completely 
reject an inductive or phenomenological approach; this is in fact an
aspect of the midlevel principles in Part II of JIP.  It is just that, for me,
Part I’s idealized step back is a necessary first move in thinking about 
the desirability of IP rights. 
Put simply, the “whether” question asks whether there is at least one 
conceivable IP system, one imaginable set of rules and institutions, that
could be justified in awarding IP rights.  The only starting point is the 
requirement that the ideal system in question really be capable of 
6. ALEXANDRA GEORGE, CONSTRUCTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (2012). 
7. Id. at 29. 
8. Id. 
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accurate description as an IP system, that is, that it include individual 
exclusive rights over discrete intangible objects.  Any imaginable instance 
of such a system will do for purposes of the initial “whether” question. 
If one or more imaginable instances of an IP system can be justified, the 
analysis moves on to a consideration of the structural features of an 
actual, operational IP system.  In JIP, this second stage is conducted 
with reference to the existing IP systems of advanced economies,
primarily the United States, but with Europe, Japan, and China always in 
the background too.  The midlevel principles described in Part II of JIP
are meant to be norms that mediate between foundational commitments 
and the detailed particularities of actual practices; in my account,
midlevel analysis comes only after the initial “whether” question has 
been answered in the affirmative.10  If an IP system can be envisioned 
that comports with foundational beliefs, attention then shifts to 
identifying norms consistent with these beliefs that arise from actual
rules, doctrines, and institutions on the ground.  These norms both reflect
existing practices and help to shape or guide them in the direction of an 
operational system more in keeping with foundational commitments. 
III. MORE ON FOUNDATIONS AND MIDLEVEL PRINCIPLES 
As I said earlier, for me a foundation answers the question of
“whether.”  Principles, on the other hand, are about “how.”  For most
purposes, there does not seem to be much confusion on this score.  The
proportionality principle, for example, explains a substantial number of 
IP rules and practices, yet I have not so far heard an argument that 
proportionality is adequate as a conceptual foundation for the field of
10. Generations of people with diverse but at least somewhat compatible ultimate 
commitments have left their imprint on the IP system when deciding difficult cases.  This
imprint takes the form of philosophical fragments (such as brief references to Locke), 
intuitions, and archetypes.  Judges and policymakers draw on this shared body of ideas 
when deciding difficult cases; and from these cases the midlevel principles arise.  Thus, 
I see midlevel principles as high-level, repeating metathemes in IP case law.  At the
conceptual level, I find that Rawls’s account of a shared public space provides a good 
model for thinking about these principles.  Not an empirical account of where they come 
from, but an idealized way to describe and discuss them.  See  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 97–98 (expanded ed. 2005) (“[G]iven the fact of reasonable pluralism,
citizens cannot agree on any moral authority . . . .  We adopt, then, a constructivist view 
to specify the fair terms of social cooperation . . . [based on] fundamental ideas of the 
















    
  
 
   




IP.11  It seems readily apparent that given the decision to award IP rights,
it makes sense to award them in rough proportion to the effort or 
contribution embodied in the works they cover. 
A.  Utilitarianism vs. Efficiency 
The exception to this is the efficiency principle. A number of JIP
readers have remarked on the seeming inconsistency of rejecting
utilitarianism as a foundation and then adopting efficiency as a basic 
operating principle.  But the answer to this conundrum lies, I believe, in 
a proper understanding of the differences between foundational concepts 
and principles.  The main point here is this: I do not believe there is
adequate data at this time to fully commit to a utilitarian grounding for 
the IP field.  And yet I believe, based on Locke, Kant, and Rawls, that 
the answer to the “whether” question is “yes.”  In a hypothetical sense, 
my cocitizens have reached a similar conclusion, based on whatever
foundational values guide them.  Having so decided, society has 
implemented a robust system of IP protection, which has as one of its 
most basic and recognizable features the idea that IP rights ought to be 
awarded and administered as efficiently as possible so as to maximize
net benefits as best we can determine. 
1. Rejecting Utilitarian Foundations 
In stating why I personally reject utilitarian foundations for the IP 
field, I say repeatedly that the data on hand are inadequate.12  This raises
two questions, which readers of JIP have been quick to see: (1) Does a
11. It is important to note, however, that midlevel principles do embody and express 
objectives and values.  They are not merely or only operational guidelines.  Though they
ultimately guide the “how” of IP policy, they can be conceptualized as products of the 
hypothetical political-deliberative process envisioned by Rawls and best captured in the
idea of an overlapping consensus. This consensus is reached in a manner Rawls describes as
“public” and “political,” by which he means that values and objectives are characterized 
in terms distinct from one’s ultimate commitments.  Only these ultimate commitments can 
fully answer the “whether” question; but the deliberative procedure based on them
nevertheless yields midlevel principles that reflect an attenuated version of foundational 
values.  Alternatively, one might say that midlevel principles are produced by a public and
political procedure; and that this procedure reflects indirectly the ultimate commitments of
those who engage in it.  So the existence of midlevel principles, on this account, reflects 
consensus on the “whether” question, despite the fact that their primary function is to 
guide the “how.” 
12. MERGES, supra note 1, at 3 (“The sheer practical difficulty of measuring or
approximating all the variables involved means that the utilitarian program will always
be at best aspirational.  Like designing a perfect socialist economy, the computational 
complexities of this philosophical project cast grave doubt on its fitness as a workable 
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utilitarian foundation really require such precise data?; and (2) Why am I 
willing to adopt alternative foundations rooted in fuzzy and amorphous 
deontological notions of autonomy and fairness while rejecting 
utilitarianism due to a lack of stringent proof?  Both questions in a sense 
come down to this issue of consistency: am I being consistent when I 
reject utilitarianism for lack of precise data while championing a set of 
foundations that themselves hardly seem a model of precision?  After all, 
there is nothing like universal agreement that Locke and company have 
arrived at the one correct and true basis for awarding private property 
rights.  So why do I say their reasons are superior in the case of IP rights?
Is it not better to build on solid data, even if incomplete, rather than vague
and sketchy concepts drawn from outmoded and opaque philosophic 
texts? 
On the first question, I feel comfortable saying that I reject utilitarian
foundations because data are what this body of thought is all about.  It is 
in the nature of utilitarianism, in other words, to require adequate data in
order to answer the question of “whether.”  Without data, it is impossible
to say whether a single act or an entire practice creates a net social 
benefit or not.  It is meaningless to say that the theory requires data for
answers, yet in the face of inadequate data we can use the theory
anyway.  Data are its lifeblood, its essence.  Therefore, lack of data is fatal.
The theory has nothing to say when the data are not adequate.  If a
theory depends on adequate data to answer the “whether” question, and 
the data are not available, the theory cannot answer the question.  Any
assertion that it can must resolve to one of two other assertions: the data
are in fact adequate, or the theory works even when a rough approximation
of adequate data is all we have to work with. 
For reasons I explain in JIP, I do not see how anyone can reasonably 
contend that the empirical data on IP protection can make a tight and 
solid case that IP protection is a net benefit for society.  There may come
a time when that is true, but I do not believe we are there yet. 
As for the second proposition, this strikes me as a highly softened and
lightened version of utilitarianism—one that strips it of much of its claim
to superiority.  The great advance that this theory represents, after all, is that
it proposes to resolve centuries of disagreement over first principles.
And how?  By recourse always and only to the facts, the objective data, 
the measurable and inarguable record of positive and negative effects.
To reject this stringency and adopt a deformed alternative is to give up 
any claim to the theory’s overall superiority.  Because what can one use
963
   
 
 


















to fill in the gaps in the data?  On what basis, if not firm data, can one 
say, “This social practice creates net benefits”?  Whatever that basis— 
reason, intuition, emotion, et cetera—it represents precisely the grounds 
for social decision that utilitarianism rejected at its birth.  “Soft” or “light”
utilitarianism represents the worst of all worlds: it is not actually data
driven, but it claims the cloak or mantle of objective data.  It is a fraud, 
playing on the natural propensity of many people to respect data and all 
conclusions that are firmly grounded in it. 
Once the skin of objectivity is pierced, what lies underneath in the case of 
utilitarianism is less convincing than certain alternative normative 
justifications for property (in general) and IP (in particular).  That is the 
essence of the argument in JIP Part I. 
2. The Difference Between Utilitarianism and Efficiency 
With all this said about utilitarianism, I turn now to efficiency.  I seem
to have done a thorough job casting aspersions on utility.  So how can I 
then champion efficiency as a basic principle of IP law?
The answer, in a nutshell, is this: once we have decided to pursue a 
social practice—such as the awarding of IP rights—it makes eminent
sense to pursue this end in a way that maximizes benefits and minimizes 
costs as best we can determine them.  Efficiency, then, describes a way
of carrying out a certain end.  It is not an independent rationale for that 
end.  Rationales are the domains of foundations, and efficiency is not 
foundational.  It is a quality or characteristic of a social practice, but it 
cannot provide a reason or ultimate motive for that practice. 
Because efficiency has become intertwined with foundational issues, I
believe its true meaning is often obscured today.  But the Oxford English 
Dictionary definition of efficient is quite clear: “Productive of effects; 
effective; adequately operative.  Of persons: Adequately skilled.”13  The
key here, I think, is the notion of effective or adequate, as opposed to 
ideal.  An efficient way of doing something is a way that works well.
Efficiency is a quality or feature of the way a certain end is pursued.  But
it does not define the thing to be pursued; it does not and cannot provide 
the end itself.  Efficiency then is in some sense always a supporting
concept when compared to the end it serves.  It is adjectival, so to speak;
it describes a way of doing something but in no sense does it guide us in
the initial choice of what to do.14 
13. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 84 (2d ed. 1989). 
14. It might seem that applying efficiency as a global principle counters this argument.
The idea would be to list all possible actions or ends, and then weigh out the costs and
benefits of each, choosing the highest net-benefit action first, and proceeding through all 
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When put this way, it is perhaps easier to see how I can both reject 
utilitarian grounds for IP law, yet vigorously support the idea of pursuing
IP rights in an efficient manner.  The data, I contend, are inadequate to 
the task of answering the “whether” question.  But once an independent
(for example, deontological) foundation is established for the field, 
whatever data can be found are most helpful in determining “how.” And
here again the definition offered above comes into play.  Efficiency is a
matter of something being “adequately operative.”15  In most areas of IP 
law and policy, we have at least some data, some useful information to
guide our actions.  The data will necessarily be incomplete in most if not
all cases.  But that is not fatal to the project of efficiency.  Adequate
operational guidance is enough.  It is quite helpful to know that it is 
more efficient to pursue goal X  by means of action A than by action B.  
In this way, an independent basis for deciding that goal X is in fact  
worthwhile shifts attention to the best available information on how to 
go about achieving goal X most effectively.
One way to get a better grasp of what I am talking about here is to see 
efficiency as essentially an “ordinal,” as opposed to cardinal, concept.16 
That is, when we are talking about efficiency, we often make an implicit 
comparison between two states, one more efficient than the other.
Comparison is the essence of the matter.  Action A is more efficient—or, 
as we often say, “a more efficient way of achieving X”—only as 
compared to action B, which leads to a lower net social benefit.  To
determine efficiency in this sense, we only need data on the pluses and 
minuses of the two alternative actions.  This type of analysis does not 
compare action A to all other possible actions, but only to action B.  The 
universe of comparison is closed, rather than open.  And what closes it,
of course, is the independent decision that goal X is worth pursuing. 
Another way of putting this is that we can pursue efficiency when data 
are incomplete, so long as we have a given end in mind.  We need some
data—enough to make a comparison between rival courses of action— 
but we do not need to decide if the ultimate end or purpose is the best 
among all possible ends.  The efficiency calculus takes this end or goal
as a given; it requires only some comparative data about the ways that 
required for such an approach are obviously not likely to be at hand.  Indeed, this global 
form of efficiency is none other than utilitarianism in disguise, which means that my
earlier critique of utilitarianism—at least in the IP setting—applies here.
15. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 84. 
16. MERGES, supra note 1, at 189. 
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the given end might be pursued.  This is, of course, much more tractable.
And this feature of efficiency is what makes it a valuable contributor to 
the tool kit available for IP analysis. 
To take a concrete example, consider the term of protection for patents 
and copyrights.  Currently these terms are set at a fixed number of years
by statute.17 Many observers of the IP scene have argued over the years 
that these fixed terms are inefficient.  For patents, a leading proposal is
to calibrate patent terms to the requirements of various industries: make
software patents shorter than the standard twenty-years-from-filing term,
for example,18 and perhaps retain the current fixed term for pharmaceutical 
patents.  For copyrights, an intriguing proposal was made by William 
Landes and Judge Richard Posner to permit infinitely long copyright 
terms that require frequent renewals, on the theory that lack of incentive 
to renew would shorten the effective copyright term for a huge number 
of copyrighted works, making the scheme as a whole far superior to the 
current one-size-fits-all regime.19 
These arguments are typically couched in the phraseology of efficiency, 
as well they might be.  The question of optimal IP terms lends itself to
the type of comparative analysis I have described.  Will overall social
cost be lower with variable patent terms, given the dual realities of 
higher administrative costs and fewer long-lived patents, that is, with 
their attendant social costs?  And for copyrights, will the heavier burden
of frequent renewals be worth the savings in social cost from having 
fewer long-lived copyrights, many of which may well be forgotten by
their owners long before they expire?  These questions are inherently
about efficiency.  They are specific examples of a more general theme,
namely, the best way to conduct a patent or copyright system at the lowest 
net cost.  But again, this is true only because the “whether” question has 
already been asked and answered.  At least on these topics, we have 
decent comparative efficiency data.  What we decidedly do not have is
the kind of data that would be required to decide whether patent or
copyright protection are good ideas overall. 
17. There are some nuances, such as requirements for renewals and term adjustments
in patent law due to administrative delays, but put these aside.
18. See  DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 96 (2009) (citing Leo J. Raskind, The Uncertain Case for Special
Legislation Protecting Computer Software, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1131 (1986); Pamela 
Samuelson, Modifying Copyrighted Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine To 
Accommodate a Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179 (1988); Richard H. Stern, The 
Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1229, 1262–67 (1986); 
John C. Phillips, Note, Sui Generis Intellectual Property Protection for Computer 
Software, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 997 (1992)). 
19. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable 
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B.  An Example of Midlevel Principles at Work
Because of the strong utilitarian origins of the IP field, I have felt it 
important to explain the efficiency principle and to distinguish it from 
foundational issues.  But efficiency is only one midlevel principle. Equally
important are the other midlevel principles.  They connect with, and 
indeed arise from, the detailed doctrines and practices that make up the
rich surface texture of IP law.  So it is crucial to see how these principles 
relate to this surface level.
To make this concrete, start with a long-running debate in copyright 
law.  At various times, artists and authors grant licenses for their works
to be adapted and exploited in various media.  So an author might grant
rights for a film adaptation of her story.  Controversy arises when new
technologies, such as videotape or DVDs, come along after a long-
running license agreement is signed.  Authors then claim that the 
contract granting the right to make a “film” does not include the new 
technologies.  But owners of the right to adapt the novel to film of course
disagree; they claim that film rights should be interpreted so as to
include the new technologies. 
The cases on this issue invoke a number of doctrines, drawn from 
copyright as well as contract law.20  In the three-part analysis described 
in JIP, this means that at the level of detailed rules and practices, there is
no clear or consistent answer to the problem of old copyright grants and
new technologies.  So it is natural to conduct policy discourse using the 
midlevel principles.  These are generalized from multiple sources; they
represent the distillation of broad concepts that span a multitude of 
20. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145
F.3d 481, 487 (2d Cir. 1998) (involving the licensing of film rights, where Boosey, 
owner of a movie copyright, argued it should be able to sign a new contract with another 
company for a videocassette version of the movie, and holding for Disney, to whom
Boosey originally licensed film rights, stating, “The words of Disney’s license are more
reasonably read to include than to exclude a motion picture distributed in video format”); 
see also Paramount Publix Corp. v. Am. TriErgon Corp., 294 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1935)
(interpreting rights to “sound recordings”); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d
851, 852 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting “television” rights).  For a summary of the
approaches courts have taken to these cases, see 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10[B], at 10-89 to 10-91 (2012), which contrasts 
the narrow, pro-licensor-creator view in the cases that licenses cover only media within
the unambiguous core of the license grant, with the broad, prolicensee view that licenses 
cover any use reasonably related to the use contemplated by the original grant.  To the
extent that Nimmer expresses a preference for the latter, broad view—which favors
























   
 
discrete doctrines.  They therefore help to bring clarity when doctrines 
and rules conflict. 
In particular, in our film rights example, it could be said that because 
smaller units of production are more likely to promote the dignity
interests of individual creators, a policy favoring these units would be an 
expression of the importance of the dignity principle in IP law.  Yet 
there is more to it than dignity.  As is well known by now, awarding ever 
more IP rights to ever larger numbers of discrete producers raises the
specter of rather serious transaction costs.  In terms of midlevel
principles, efficiency concerns are a major obstacle to the promotion of 
creativity in smaller units of production.
In the end it is not important for present purposes to arrive at an 
answer to the question of copyright licenses and new technologies.
Depending on one’s estimate of the dignity value of creating alone or in
a small team, as opposed to within a large company, and also on one’s 
estimate of the increased transaction costs that would stem from a small-
unit-favoring policy, the argument could come out one way or the other. 
The point here is to show how midlevel principles work in practice.
What they do for this debate is to provide a common language, a standard
conceptual toolkit, that permits sophisticated analysis and argumentation
beyond the level of individual cases, norms, and practices.  This allows
discourse at a higher level of generality.  It also spurs the field on to a
deeper and richer plane—one that connects the pressing issues of today,
with their inevitable technical and commercial details, with the ruptures 
caused by controversies of the past. 
C.  Other Candidates for the Midlevel Principles? 
My plea for a middle level of discourse in the IP field seems to have 
caught the attention of at least a few readers.21  There seems to be
support for the idea of such principles, but it is also safe to say that others
have strong and divergent ideas about the precise contours they should 
follow.  To some extent, I anticipated a good deal of push and pull over 
this part of JIP; as I said, “There are also other plausible candidate
principles in addition to these four. . . . [T]here is room for a diversity of
organizing and explanatory principles. . . .  One chapter cannot do it
all.”22  Yet even so, the critiques of the four principles I described are such
that I feel the need to say a few more words in defense of my approach. 
21. See Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and Property in IP): 
A Review of Justifying Intellectual Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033 (2012); David
H. Blankfein-Tabachnick, Intellectual Property Doctrine and Midlevel Principles, 101
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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A good example of the critique I am describing is found in the 
companion article for this volume by Eric Claeys.  Professor Claeys
believes that the principles I identified are deficient in that they do not 
draw enough on the structural and theoretical elements of property.  In 
other words, there is not enough property theory in the middle layer of 
my three-part structure for his taste.23 
At the outset let me say that in writing JIP I tried for what might be 
described as “meta-midlevel” principles, ones that encompassed as
broad a sweep of the IP field as I could take in.  So I think if I had more 
time, I could integrate Professor Claeys’s property-oriented principles 
into the structure of JIP, perhaps with some major tweaks.  There is
much to be said for the idea of taking fine-grained aspects of property
theory—roughly congruent with each stick in the property entitlement
bundle, so to speak—and integrating them into more fine-grained
midlevel principles.  I think control rights, usufruct, trespass, and the 
like are all useful overarching concepts for IP law, and might effectively 
find expression as useful midlevel principles. 
Nevertheless, I still feel that property concepts are often not going to 
be quite adequate to explain high-level themes in IP law.  The parable of 
the bridge in my book,24 for example, has a good deal of overlap with 
the concept of accession in the law of property.  But I meant this parable
to do more work than accession generally does.  I wanted it to include an
element of distributive justice and desert theory that I do not necessarily 
see in most accounts of accession.25  Consider Professor Claeys’s own 
description of how accession would apply to the bridge parable.  He
describes the basic problem as whether Al, the owner of the land along 
the river bank, or the bridge builders, who construct a bridge touching on 
23. See Claeys, supra note 21, at 1037, 1054–58. 
24. MERGES, supra note 1, at 162–65. 
25. At least one well-reasoned account of the accession principle explicitly
recognizes that this principle is in conflict with certain normative impulses at work in the
legal system:
[A]ccession creates a multiplier effect enhancing the wealth of owners of discrete
assets that does not apply to those who have only a claim on a general share of
societal resources.  Finally, accession contributes to an expanding sphere of
property and a concomitant shrinking of the public domain.  If one believes 
that there is inherent value in preserving the public domain—a proposition widely
endorsed today by many intellectual property scholars—then accession has
problematic consequences for this reason, too.
Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 459, 462 
(2009). 
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Al’s land, should be the sole owner of the land-plus-bridge combination.26 
As he says, 
Although different doctrines treat accession differently depending on context, at
the level of policy, accession focuses on: (1) whether the objects at issue are
more likely to be used productively as separate entities or as a single package 
entity; and (2) whether observers are likely to perceive the objects as one
“thing” or multiple “things.”27 
This description emphasizes first, efficiency or productivity, and 
second, the perceptions of third parties as the key elements in working 
through the bridge scenario.  What is missing, it seems to me, is a direct
discussion of the respective contributions of the two parties.  The accession
story focuses on efficient and commonsense accounts of appropriate 
asset bundles, whereas the bridge story in Chapter 6 of JIP is meant to 
capture something broader: the relative contributions of the two
parties—the degree and significance of their effort, the value unlocked
by the part they play in creating the land-plus-bridge combination.
Although IP cases and doctrines can be found that illustrate the 
importance of proper asset bundling, proportionality is meant to describe 
a wider variety of doctrines whose essence is the weighing of relative 
contributions.  That explains why I pitched the proportionality principle 
at such a high degree of generality.  Put another way, the accession story
can be explained strictly in efficiency terms.  Yet I find that in IP law, 
the handling of accession-type problems often includes a comparison of 
the relative contributions of the two parties to the dispute.  This 
additional dimension implicates a principle other than straightforward 
efficiency of optimal asset bundling. I call this additional dimension
proportionality.
I realize that all four of the midlevel principles are pitched at a high 
level of abstraction.  This is no accident; it flows from the nature of the 
IP field and the major conceptual crosscurrents that cut through it. The
notion of a midlevel principle comes from Jules Coleman, who first
employed the idea to explain important features of tort law.28  For  
Coleman, the principle of corrective justice is central to understanding tort
law.29  This served as a template for me—an example of a general 
overarching principle that connects and explains disparate aspects of a
broad field. But IP law is very different from tort law.  To be sure, there 
are ways in which IP law overlaps with torts.  Wendy Gordon’s work on
26. Claeys, supra note 21, at 1040–42, 1054. 
27. Id. at 1054. 
28. See  JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 5 (2001). 
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IP law as unjust enrichment explores these overlaps in detail.30  But there 
are vast swaths of IP law that are not adequately explained by concepts
drawn from torts.  For example, even though a defendant blatantly 
copies a patented invention, patent law will let the defendant off the 
hook if information about the invention in question was theoretically
available in an extremely obscure locale that was unknown to the defendant. 
This appears to defy principles of corrective justice, but makes sense
when the IP midlevel principle of nonremoval from the public domain is 
taken into account.  Likewise, exceptions to IP infringement liability,
such as fair use for copyright and experimental use for patents, are 
applied despite the fact that infringement is thought to harm right holders. 
Countervailing considerations, such as efficiency and proportionality,
outweigh the harm in these cases. 
My point is this: neither Coleman’s corrective justice nor Claeys’s
property-based principles are broad enough to embrace the diverse rules 
and doctrines at work in IP law.  If this means that the midlevel principles
of JIP seem highly general—if they seem like metaprinciples—then the 
cause must be said to be the nature of IP law itself.
IV. FOUNDATIONS AS TIEBREAKERS 
So it is that the midlevel principles arise from the details of everyday
IP practice, and then come to cabin and shape controversies in the future.  
But what about the foundational commitments I discussed earlier, those 
that take up Part I of JIP?  Where do they fit in?  How do they connect
with and relate to the other two levels of analysis? 
Basically, foundational commitments play the same role as the midlevel 
principles, only at a higher level of analysis.  Foundational values underlie 
all the midlevel principles.  Yet the foundations of the IP field serve a 
different purpose from the other levels of analysis, and this makes a 
difference in how they can be applied in controversial cases.  Foundations 
answer the “whether” question: whether it makes sense for society to 
make a social commitment to IP.  Because they serve a very different 
function, they cannot be expected to operate interchangeably with midlevel 
principles and detailed doctrines.  Sometimes, in rare cases, foundational 
commitments can help resolve deep-seated conflicts between principles,
30. See Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual 














     













but in the general run of cases, it is the principles themselves that must
be used to resolve conflicts of this nature. 
This is so because of the inherent pluralism built into the foundational 
level.  As I put it in Part I of JIP, there is “room at the bottom” when it
comes to foundational justifications for IP law.31  Different and 
nonoverlapping justifications are possible.  So one who finds the ultimate
rationale for IP protection in the pages of the Torah and one who finds it 
in a detailed cost-benefit analysis based on the best available data can
both support and contribute to the basic institutions of an IP system.  Yet
for those institutions to work well, it is important that these competing 
justifications not come into conflict too often.  It should not be necessary
in most cases to resort to these ultimate commitments to resolve a
pressing problem; that is what the midlevel principles are for.  They 
provide a shared language and a common set of conceptual tools with
which to discuss difficult policy issues.  They are the equivalent to Rawls’s
“overlapping consensus” in the world of IP.32  Their entire purpose is to 
make it unnecessary in most cases to resort to foundational commitments 
to resolve the clash of competing policies. 
A.  On Ties, and How To Break Them
Yet even so, there are occasions when foundational commitments will 
color one’s view as to which competing policy wins out.  In most cases,
it will be enough to choose one midlevel principle over another: efficiency
over proportionality, or dignity over nonremoval, for example. But in a
few cases the competing principles may be in equipoise. A compelling 
efficiency story may run headlong into a persuasive threat to the dignity
interest.  In such a case, a foundational commitment may come into play
as a “tiebreaker.”
Consider the example of copyright licenses and later-developed media,
which we discussed earlier in Part III.B.  When an author licenses, say, 
“film rights” to a licensee, there are good reasons to permit the licensee
to exploit the licensed work in videotape or DVD format.  One important
argument is that reading the grant broadly in this way prevents the 
author from slowing down the diffusion of works in the new media.  For 
to read the grant narrowly is to permit the author to renegotiate the 
original license—a process which permits the author to revisit the terms
of the original deal and to propose new terms more in the author’s favor. 
The licensee’s settled expectations may be upset.  And in any event, the 
transaction costs of all these renegotiations increase the net cost of the
31. MERGES, supra note 1, at 10. 
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new media format, thus delaying its adoption in the market.  The midlevel
efficiency principle is, as I argued earlier, surely implicated here.
The counterarguments in this situation largely revolve around issues 
of fairness—that is, proportionality—and dignity.  Why should the licensee
enjoy the windfall that flows from the development of a new media 
format?  Was it not the author who created the work that now may reach
potential new markets via the new medium?  And if renegotiation occurs, is
this not a good thing in that the author may be able to obtain a bigger 
slice of the profits than he or she was able to obtain in the original 
licensing deal?  Surely this implicates the author’s ability to make a 
living as an author, an important aspect of the dignity principle as I
describe it in JIP. 
A conflict of principles at this level may thus lead one back to
foundational commitments.  If one believes, as I do, that autonomy lies 
at the very heart of Kant’s defense of property rights, one might conclude
that because smaller production units increase individual autonomy, the 
policy favoring small-unit production should be followed as often as it is 
reasonably feasible.  This is true despite the fact that transaction costs
will increase under such a policy.33  In the specific case under discussion, 
the conclusion would be to read the initial grant of film rights narrowly, 
so that the original author does indeed have a right to negotiate a new 
license when new media are later developed. 
Kant’s emphasis on autonomy supports an appeal to the value of 
small, autonomous units of production even in the face of higher than
optimal transaction costs. This could take many forms in IP law, but the 
basic idea would be to provide some special encouragement for the 
creation of IP-protected works by individuals or small companies.  Such 
a proposal would stress the benefits not only of creative works in 
general, but more specifically of a certain locus of production for such
works—creation by lone individuals or within small companies or 
teams. 
In the context of the film adaptation example given earlier, resort to 
Kantian foundations would support a policy of favoring the original 
creator in a new technology controversy.  If we take seriously Kant’s 
concern for autonomy, we would favor the original creator who granted 
film rights at an earlier time.  Deciding that this grant does not encompass
33. See generally Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative 












   
videotape or DVD formats would of course favor the creator-grantor; it 
would mean that the licensee in the original contract does not
automatically have rights to the videotape and DVD version of the film 
they created under the original license.  The author-creator who made 
the earlier grant could then choose to reach a separate license contract 
with another company.  Interpreting the original agreement in a way that 
permits this new contract gives the creator—the author of the novel in 
our example—greater freedom to strike a new deal.  This he or she 
might choose to do if the original film version was not satisfactory, not
true to the spirit of the novel, or simply not as profitable as hoped.34  The
author could even strike a new deal with the holder of the original film-
rights license, in which case the only effect of the contract interpretation
would be to enhance the income of the creator of the original work.  The 
overall point remains the same: an emphasis on Kantian autonomy leads 
to an interpretation of the original contract that favors the creator or 
author, because doing so increases the viability and independence of the 
small-unit-of-production entity—the author. 
B.  Reviewing the Three Levels of Analysis 
The new technologies example provides a good opportunity not only
to see how foundational commitments can act as tiebreakers, but also to 
review all three levels of analysis described in JIP.  By way of
summarizing the preceding thought, we can think of the three levels in
the following way as applied to the problem at hand: 
34. There is an obvious corollary here in those provisions of the Copyright Act 
permitting authors to terminate earlier transfers of rights after the passage of time or 
upon the grant of an additional copyright term by the legislature.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 
304 (2006); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Pooh-poohing Copyright Law’s “Inalienable”





























[VOL. 49:  957, 2012] Foundations and Principles in IP Law
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Level Analysis
3. Detailed Rules 
and Practices 
Cases interpreting copyright licenses in light of new 
technologies are mixed and somewhat inconsistent. 
Leading treatises provide nuanced guidance, but close




Efficiency might dictate lesser fragmentation of rights,
reduction in holdup opportunities; this might run in
favor of the original licensee, meaning that a holder of 
film rights should also have the right to sell the movie 
in videotape and DVD format.  But the dignity interest 
of the original creator might push in the direction of
permitting an author to enter a new exploitation 
contract if dissatisfied with the original film version. 
1. Foundations 
Kantian autonomy for original authors means greater 
control of and remuneration from exploitation of works
in different media, using new technologies developed
after the initial grant of rights. 
I do not mean to make this all seem too algorithmic.  Yet at the same 
time, the relationship between the three levels of analysis in JIP can, I 
think, usefully be seen as a progression of sorts.  Starting at the highest 
level, that of detailed rules and practices, a specific problem is first
placed into its proper doctrinal frame. Standard practices are consulted. 
If an easy answer emerges, that may well be the end of things.  Of course,
conventional understandings may come to seem somehow at odds with
more basic principles, so the analysis does not necessarily end here.  But 
in many cases this is as far as one needs to go.  Where conventional doctrine
and practices represent a stable embodiment of midlevel principles, and
where those principles rest on a convincing conceptual foundation, the 
conventional answer may well be adequate and indeed satisfying.
Closer cases require a drop down to the midlevel principles.
Doctrines may be in tension; practices may be in flux, or under pressure,
from changed conditions. When this is so, a move to deeper conceptual 
principles is in order.  Often, doctrines will come into tension because 
underlying principles dictate opposing results in a given case.  Resorting
to the principles themselves then makes sense. And once a doctrinal 






   










    




principles, it may make a decision easier.  It will at any rate deepen the
conversation—and recall that a key benefit of the midlevel principles is 
that they provide a shared conceptual space, or common vocabulary, in 
which to conduct such conversations.  This is because the midlevel 
principles are derived from a host of different doctrines and practices. 
Conversation at this level thus necessarily abstracts away from strictly
doctrinal details.  It allows for a more general, more policy-oriented type
of analysis than the specifically doctrinal level permits. 
Often the choice of principle will be only slightly contentious.  Where 
this is so, the analysis need not go beyond the midlevel.  But, as described
above, there are times when the midlevel analysis leaves one quite at sea 
as to the proper direction to take. Major principles such as proportionality
and efficiency or dignity and nonremoval may be in equipoise.  On these 
occasions, resorting to the foundational level as a tiebreaker becomes 
necessary.  Only reference to one’s fundamental commitments is sufficient 
to resolve a knotty issue that ends up stalemated in the realm of midlevel
principles. 
C.  Is There a Risk of Unraveling? 
The tiebreaker metaphor works well enough, but it raises a potential 
difficulty.  What prevents every issue, or at least very many issues, from 
being declared a deadlock, requiring resort to the next lower level of 
analysis?  What if, in effect, most controversies are or can be characterized
as ties?  Then resort to the tiebreaker is necessary in most if not all cases,
which collapses this fine-tuned, three-stage analysis into what is effectively 
only one stage.  And what is worse, from the point of view of predictability, 
the tiebreaker level is one where pluralism is quite intentionally tolerated. 
Which of course means that many issues will result not only in contentious 
arguments, but also in battles over deeply held, fundamental convictions. 
What then?  Does the entire structure necessarily collapse under the
heavy weight of too many tiebreakers? Does the whole elaborate system
unravel? 
I don’t think so for one simple reason: there aren’t that many ties to 
break. There is no need to resort to lower levels of analysis in many cases. 
Not every detailed doctrinal case is hard, so it is not always necessary to 
invoke midlevel principles.  And even where doctrine or operational rules
leave room for doubt, requiring resort to midlevel principles, this does 
not inevitably mean a head-on clash of principles that in turn necessitates 
resort to foundations for resolution.  There are ample resources within
each of the first two levels with which to resolve many disputed issues,
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It would require a great deal of exposition to make a full-fledged
defense of this position.  Given my space limitations here, let me limit my
comments to one (necessarily inadequate) example.  The first concerns
issues that are of workaday interest in copyright and patent law:
doctrines of authorship and patent validity.  Often these may be applied
in a straightforward way to obtain a predictable answer.  The logic of the
legal requirements is embodied in a number of technical doctrines and
rules, but the basic pattern is easy enough to describe.  Once the facts 
surrounding the origin of the work in question are ascertained, the relevant 
doctrines will become apparent.  For authorship, it may be necessary to 
know what two or more alleged coauthors did and what they contributed
to a given work.  For patent validity, the nature of the invention and the 
most important pieces of prior art must be ascertained.  But in any event, 
once the facts are known, a court or lawyer looking at them can often 
reach a fully defensible judgment about the proper legal outcome.
This does not mean that midlevel principles are not at all involved. 
Quite the contrary.  These principles are derived from, and supply the 
guiding force behind, the IP doctrines that apply in these cases.  The
principles are embedded into the doctrines.  So, for example, questions
of coauthorship bring together two midlevel principles.  First, efficiency 
is central, in that the high transaction costs that follow from a fragmented 
ownership structure for a single work covered by copyright militates in
favor of a significant minimum threshold requirement for the status of an
author.  Second, dignity comes into play, in that fairness seems to dictate 
that one who makes a sizeable contribution to a copyrighted work ought
to share in the ownership rights.
The point here is that these midlevel principles will seldom have to be 
explicitly invoked in a run-of-the-mill question of coauthorship status. 
The specific lines of cases and subdoctrines that make up the details of 
this area of copyright already embody the relevant principles.  Although
there may be controversy about the facts of a case, once it is identified as 
a coauthorship dispute the midlevel principles will seldom need to be 
explicitly invoked.  They are latent within the cases and doctrines that
will be deployed to resolve the issue.  Once in a while, a new type of case 
might arise, or an important court might decide to revisit or revise an old 
established doctrine.  In such a case, one or more of the midlevel principles
may be discussed more explicitly than usual.  But in the main this is an
unusual event, and overall the threat of persistent unraveling from level 
three to level two does not appear very great. 
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The analysis in JIP was meant to show the benefits of three distinct 
levels of analysis in IP law.  I took pains in that book to explain how 
each level differed from the other two, and to emphasize the distinct
functions of the separate levels.  In this brief Article, I have tried to
address the relationship between the three levels—the points of contact
and occasions when two adjoining levels interact with each other.  I still 
believe in the benefits of this tripartite division.  But I hope I have also
shown that there is, and should be, something less than complete 
acoustic separation between them.  That at any rate has been my goal. 
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